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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper reviews current research relevant to new product development, customer 
development, and the lean startup. Customer development and the lean startup are a new and 
increasingly used form of entrepreneurship process, which rely on hypothesis testing but not 
in the traditional sense; the entrepreneur is encouraged to scan the environment, collect 
information, and form and evaluate educated guesses so as to make accurate judgments and 
decisions. The present research provides a review of the customer development model for 
entrepreneurial activities and a critique of this hypothesis testing methodology. We then 
consider ways in which to improve decision making within the startup via a systematic study 
of System 1 ( intuition) and System 2 ( reasoned and rational) decision-making styles. This 
paper has significant implications for entrepreneurs, entrepreneurship support organizations, 
such as incubators and accelerators, and entrepreneurship educators, all of whom are 
increasingly practicing and teaching this process. 
 
Keywords: biases and heuristics, customer development, entrepreneurship, innovation, lean 
startup, new product development 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper discusses a newly emerging and 
increasingly popular approach to 
entrepreneurial practice known as customer 
development and the “lean startup” process 
(Blank, 2007; Blank & Dorf, 2012; Ries, 
2011; Maurya, 2012). For purposes of this 
paper, the lean startup process is defined as 
an approach to entrepreneurial and 
innovative activities that emphasizes 
placing resources into the creation of 
customer value, viewing all other activity as 
waste until a fit is found between the 
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product and the intended market. The lean 
startup relies upon a process called 
customer development, which is a method 
of creating and testing assumptions 
regarding the end business model for the 
startup. The lean startup process is rapidly 
being adopted by university 
entrepreneurship programs, accelerators, 
entrepreneurial organizations like Startup 
Weekend, communities, and even the NSF 
(2012), which is employing this 
methodology for its Innovation Corps Sites 
Program. However, there has been very 
little if any systematic analysis of the lean 
startup and customer development 
methodologies. Therefore, we place 
customer development within the 
theoretical context of new product 
development; the methods by which the 
entrepreneur determines the viability of the 
innovation as well as the needs, features, 
and functionality for the product clearly fall 
under the overarching framework of new 
product development whether in an 
entrepreneurial or more stable environment. 
We review customer development as an 
entrepreneurial practice within the context 
of earlier product development models such 
as Cooper’s New Product Development 
(NPD) (Cooper 1988; Cooper 2008) and 
Koen’s (2004) new concept model for the 
fuzzy front end (FFE).   
 
Within this theoretical framework, we turn 
to a key issue in customer development. 
More than earlier forms of NPD, customer 
development relies heavily on hypothesis 
testing, but not in the traditional sense. 
Instead, the entrepreneur is encouraged to 
survey the environment, collect 
information, and form and evaluate 
educated guesses so as to make accurate 
judgments and decisions. Customer 
development recognizes that there may be a 
place for “intuition” within the 
entrepreneurial process and responds to the 
need to validate this intuition with more 
formal processes that make sense in the 
highly uncertain and time-sensitive startup 
environment.   Below  we  briefly review 
formal methods of hypothesis testing and 
review Blank’s notion  of   "hypothesis 
testing” and find it lacking in rigor. Using 
the concept of System 1 (intuitive) and 
System 2 (systematic, reasoned) thinking 
(Stanovich and West, 2000), we then 
suggest methods which could be integrated 
into the customer development process to 
mitigate the significant risks of these biases, 
and place these in the context of 
entrepreneurial practice and teaching. 
 
CUSTOMER DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF NPD 
 
New product development over the past two 
decades has been heavily influenced by the 
“stage-gate” model, developed by Cooper 
(1988, 2001). A significant benefit of the 
traditional NPD model is its structure, 
allowing companies to follow a roadmap 
and prescriptive steps guiding their process. 
Yet, according to Cooper, the traditional 
new product development process was 
designed for incremental product 
development and “... may be inappropriate 
…” (Cooper, 2001, p. 151) when applied to 
breakthrough and platform projects. A 
limitation of the early, traditional NPD 
model is the emphasis on incremental 
product improvement with a cursory focus 
on ideation and discovery. Other limitations 
include a defined linear  process with the 
implication that “looping back” to an earlier 
stage denotes a gating  mistake or gating 
error in development. In addition, product 
development cycles, sped up today by 
competitive markets and enabled by 
technologies such as rapid prototyping 
(even on the desktop with 3D printing for 
example) and internet distribution, can be 
slowed significantly by the traditional NPD 
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approach. In addition, stage gate may 
actually lead to a difficulty delivering final 
products because each stage has higher 
costs and may take longer as the company 
moves through the process (Anderson, 
1993). The traditional NPD model proposed 
by Cooper (1988)  and as modified (Cooper, 
2001)  may be viewed as a very successful 
attempt at a very logical  and  coherent 
methodology of launching new products. 
Cooper emphasizes the need for customer-
facing activities in the earliest stages of 
NPD, with the realization that many 
projects fail because of an overemphasis of 
the technical tasks over the 
marketing/business-oriented tasks during 
what he calls the “homework” or 
predevelopment stage (Cooper 2011; 
Cooper 2013; Cooper, 2013a). As Edgett 
(2011) notes, activities taken before the 
formal design and development of the 
product play a key role in determining 
success or failure. Cooper (2014) himself 
has recognized the need for a more flexible 
process and has recently proposed “the 
Triple A System” of an adaptive, agile and 
accelerated modification to Stage Gate (p. 
21). 
 
There is an abundance of research showing 
how greater emphasis on the front-end 
activities (meeting the needs of customers) 
explains why some products are more 
successful than others (Henard & 
Szymanski 2001). In studying a number of 
industries, Koen (2004) observed that 
communication and decision making is 
circular, nonlinear, and non-sequential, 
rather than following the linear model of 
NPD. The new concept model (NCD) 
developed by Koen (2004) was designed to 
emphasize that ideas are thought to flow, 
circulate, and iterate between and among 
five elements: opportunity identification, 
opportunity analysis, idea generation, idea 
selection, and concept definition. This 
contrasts with the traditional, sequential 
NPD process where “looping back” may be 
viewed as a gating error as opposed to a 
reasoned, positive correction. 
 
In contrast to the traditional NPD process, 
new concept development processes include 
a greater focus on idea generation activities 
such as in-depth interviews, brainstorming, 
and idea management tools (e.g., 
crowdsourcing) aimed at potential and 
current customers, lead users, employees, 
and other stakeholders. Early innovation 
FFE activities are often disorganized, 
unpredictable, and unstructured, as opposed 
to the later phases of new product 
development which are typically a more 
structured and formalized process. Koen 
defines the FFE as all activities that come 
before product development (Stage 3) of the 
five steps of the traditional NPD process. 
Likewise, Brentani and Reid (2012) define 
FFE as “the time and activity prior to an 
organization’s first screen of a new product 
idea, “ (p. 70), implying the FFE “ends” at 
the point of traditional “product 
development” activities. In other words, it 
can be argued that NPD and FFE processes 
are product-centric and downplay the 
ensuing business development activities, 
taking for granted that these processes are 
embedded in a larger company’s already 
existing structure. Blank (2007) on the other 
hand carries his customer development 
approach all through the new product 
development and launch process, arguing 
that any functional systematization (e.g., 
“company building”) occurs and continues 
after product launch, and that customer 
development is essentially never truly 
“completed.” 
 
Table 1 describes some key differences 
between traditional new product 
development (NPD), the fuzzy front end 
(FFE) and as described by Koen et al. 
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Table 1: Differences between Traditional NPD, FFE, and CD 
 
 New Product 
Development (NPD) 
Fuzzy Front End 
(FFE) 
 
Customer 
Development 
(CD) 
Nature of Work Disciplined and goal-
oriented with a project 
plan 
Experimental, often 
chaotic. “Eureka” 
moments. 
Can schedule work—
but not invention 
 
Iterative, with 
continual influx 
of new 
information 
processing 
hypotheses 
Commercialization High degree of certainty 
at conclusion 
Unpredictable or 
uncertain 
 
Higher degree 
of certainty 
after completion 
of CD process 
Funding Date Budgeted Variable — in the 
beginning phases 
many projects may 
be “bootlegged,” 
while others will 
need funding to 
proceed 
Only for 
minimum viable 
product until 
business and 
sales model 
developed 
Revenue 
Expectations 
Predictable, with 
increasing certainty, 
analysis, and 
documentation as the 
product release date gets 
closer. 
Often uncertain, with 
a great deal of 
speculation 
Must know 
sales and 
pricing model 
for first stage 
introduction 
Activity Multifunction product 
and/or process 
development team 
Individuals and team 
conducting research 
to minimize risk and 
optimize potential 
 
All members 
involved in 
extensive 
“outside of the 
building,” 
largely 1:1 
customer 
contact 
Measure of 
Milestone 
achievement  
Progress Strengthened 
concept 
Minimum 
viable product; 
product/market 
fit 
Expenses Increase with each stage Increase with each 
stage 
Revenue can 
begin after 
MVP identified 
Decision Process Go/No Go Kill stages
  
Indeterminate Pivots to new 
directions 
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(2002) and Koen (2004), and customer 
development as described by Blank (2007). 
 
Customer Development (CD) 
Over the past several years, a new approach 
to the fuzzy front end, loosely grouped 
under the rubric of “customer 
development,” has been advocated and 
promoted by Blank (2007) and others, such 
as Blank and Dorf (2013), Cooper and 
Vlaskovits (2013), and Maurya (2012). The 
customer development model considers four 
interlocking and circular stages: 1) 
customer discovery, a focus on 
understanding customer problems and 
needs, 2) customer validation, the 
identification of a scalable and  repeatable 
sales model, 3) customer creation, creating 
and driving end user demand, and 4) 
company building, the transitioning of the 
organization from one designed for learning 
and discovery to efficient execution. A 
unique feature is that, following the initial 
“hunches” of the entrepreneurial team 
regarding their business model, customer 
development is almost entirely a process of 
direct contact with customers and others 
outside the company for knowledge 
acquisition and hypothesis testing (Blank & 
Dorf, 2012). All assumptions are to be 
challenged through the first phase of CD. A 
product should be launched (“put into the 
hands of customers”) as soon as possible to 
increase the level of feedback. As Blank 
(2007, p. 21) notes, “In essence, Customer 
Discovery and Customer Validation 
corroborate your business model. 
Completing these first two steps verifies 
your market, locates your customers, tests 
the perceived value of your product, 
identifies the economic buyer, establishes 
your pricing and channel strategy, and 
checks out your sales cycle and process.”  
Only then, according to Blank, does the 
company move to creating the full business 
plan and company development. 
Proponents of customer development assert 
that the greatest risk for failure for any 
innovative product is not development of 
the product but the lack of product-market 
fit. Good fit drives growth. Poor fit can 
manifest itself in a lack of customers, and/or 
difficulty in identifying customers, and/or 
the higher costs involved in finding 
customers  for  the  innovation.  Methods of  
mitigating this risk of poor fit are of 
considerable value to the effort. As such the 
focus is on the early stages of innovation. 
Proponents of a  structured CD approach 
(Reis, 2012; Blank & Dorf, 2012) 
recommend a    significant  degree of 
“certainty” in the product-market fit before 
the company pursues building a formalized, 
complete business plan. Mullins (2013) also 
argues for significant customer 
development activity prior even to the 
launch of a business. As well as arguing for 
more traditional analysis of factors such as 
competition and market conditions, he 
proposes a process of customer 
interviewing very similar to customer 
development approaches. 
 
Another key feature of CD is product 
simplicity, often called the “minimum 
viable product.” In this model, the product 
is a set of  “minimal requirements,” which 
meet the needs of the core group of early 
adopters or users. Also, cash burn is kept to 
a minimum until creating and driving end 
user demand (customer creation), and 
unlike the traditional NPD model, there are 
no kill gates, only continual iteration and 
reintroduction. Using the principles of the 
lean startup (Ries, 2011), Blank & Dorf 
(2012) argue for shipping product to early 
adopters rapidly and then following up with 
customer driven improvements, creating an 
iterative product development process. The 
lean startup methodology allows for 
significant changes throughout the process, 
often called “pivots,” (Ries, 2011). 
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DelVecchio, White and Phelan (2014) note 
that with traditional NPD, “If customer 
feedback indicates a major redesign is 
required, the product will likely cease 
moving on to the next stage and the 
gatekeeper will “kill” the development of 
the product.” (p. 7) 
CUSTOMER DISCOVERY AND 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
Proponents of customer discovery 
emphasize hypothesis development and 
testing as an integral part of the customer 
development process.  Below we review 
Blank’s interpretation of “hypothesis 
testing,” followed by a brief discussion of 
more formal models of hypothesis testing 
(frequentist and Bayesian). Next we make 
an argument that a more attainable goal is to 
focus on the frailties of entrepreneurial 
decision-making, and then consider ways to 
improve it. 
 
A key process in customer development is 
the testing of hypotheses about the 
problems faced by customers, the minimum 
feature set of the product, the 
product/market fit, product improvements, 
etc. Hypothesis development is concerned 
with how we determine what we initially 
think is “true” about the world and, given 
appropriate information, what then appears 
to be actually “true” about the world. The 
outcome of such testing guides decision 
making. Proponents of CD define a  three-
stage process, which includes a first stage of 
generating hypotheses, followed by testing 
the hypotheses, and finally, using the results 
of testing to evaluate the hypothesis. The 
challenge for the entrepreneur, as Blank 
(2013) suggests, is to generate and test 
hypotheses rapidly and frequently, and 
evaluate and reevaluate results before 
coming to the decision-making stage and 
identifying a course of action. Depending 
on the type of new product or new business, 
this can be done in a  completely iterative 
process (such as for a  website  that is 
upgraded constantly) or in a step-by-step 
process, such as for a  physical  product 
where prototypes must be tested regularly. 
For Blank, hypothesis generation is 
essentially a founding team process based 
upon intuition into the market, beginning 
with educated guesses about the nature of 
the problem(s) and the target market the 
company proposes to address. 
 
Hypothesis testing follows these intuitions 
about the business model and is conducted 
by what Blank (2007) calls “getting out of 
the building” – in other words, talking to 
customers, users, and experts, to determine 
whether the problem, which the startup 
posits, is indeed significant and what the 
scope and characteristics of that problem 
may be. The hypothesis evaluation step at 
this stage is again one of team review and 
discussion, a group process. The next step is 
a continuation of the first, wherein a 
prototype or first iteration of product, what 
Ries (2011) deems the “minimum viable 
product,” is exposed again to the customer 
and hypotheses regarding its value are again 
tested. For Blank and other adherents of 
customer development, this process does 
not end, as each new decision involves 
another set of hypotheses that must be 
generated, tested, and evaluated. Each 
tested hypothesis yields a decision, a course 
of action. For Blank, this process is almost 
entirely derived from subjective information 
obtained by direct one-to-one contact with 
potential customers, suppliers, partners, etc. 
 
As noted, Blank’s (2007) CD process is 
built on a continual cycle of hypothesis 
testing, decisions, and corrections, which 
lends itself well to situations of highly 
novel product introductions where there is 
direct contact with potential consumers. In 
this way, entrepreneurial decision-making 
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may indeed be viewed as   a   form of 
scientific process of discovery and learning 
rather than a  purely intuitive process of 
recognition and alertness to market 
conditions. (Harper, 1999). Blank’s 
customer development hypothesis 
development and evaluation is a Bayesian
decision-making process, as proposed by 
Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom (1983). That 
is, one develops hypotheses (prior belief) 
based upon experience or intuition, 
identifies data sources useful to evaluate 
hypotheses, observes or gathers data to 
evaluate the truth of competing hypotheses, 
aggregates data into an overall appraisal of 
likelihood of a hypothesis being accurate, 
and selects a course of action based upon 
that evaluation. The ultimate goal is to 
make good decisions. Yet, as is well known, 
true Bayesian decision making requires 
significant amounts of data, which the 
entrepreneurial environment may not 
provide, nor the entrepreneur be able to 
implement. 
 
Hypothesis testing in scientific efforts is 
grounded in rigorous statistical thinking. 
Formal models for hypothesis testing are 
logical and systematic processes. The 
essence of hypothesis testing is concerned 
with how one decides whether there is a 
match between what we initially think is 
true and what the evidence (data) shows is 
not true. That is, is the evidence strong 
enough to reject the corresponding null 
hypothesis? In practice, effective decision 
making follows from “truth” as determined 
by statements of hypotheses (educated 
guesses), the testing (evaluation) of 
hypotheses, and the verification of 
hypotheses. However, Blank’s (2007) 
entrepreneurial hypothesis testing methods 
are informal and tend to rely on intuitive 
thinking as noted above and discussed 
below. Blank (2007) refers to “hypothesis 
testing” as talking to customers, users, 
experts, etc., to determine whether what the 
startup sees as a problem is indeed one, and 
what the scope and characteristics of that 
problem may be. As we will see later, this 
form of informal hypothesis testing is prone 
to certain biases and heuristics which can 
impair its accuracy. 
There are two general types of hypothesis 
testing methods: frequentist and Bayesian. 
The classical frequentist-based hypothesis 
testing is a formal statistical process; 
however, within the social context of 
entrepreneurial activities, classical 
hypothesis testing is problematic given 
limited information, subjective opinion, and 
the need for rapid decisions. On the other 
hand, Bayesian inference is a normative 
method in the sense of prescribing how 
hypotheses should be evaluated given prior 
information and new information. The 
Bayesian model is better suited to the 
analysis of subjective information and 
opinion, which makes it much more 
relevant to entrepreneurial decision-making 
and customer development. Nevertheless, 
the data requirements are tedious and thus 
appear to be impractical relative to decision 
making in the entrepreneurial context. The 
complications of elementary Bayesian 
decision making are discussed in Lindley 
(1985). Therefore, instead of focusing on 
hypothesis testing, either classical or 
Bayesian, we focus on a more attainable 
goal, reducing the biases inherent in 
entrepreneurial decision making, especially 
in the context of customer development. 
 
Risks of Customer Development from 
Biases and Heuristics   
To set the stage for reducing bias in 
decision making, we now examine some of 
the most significant biases and risks in 
customer development hypothesis testing 
and then, using the concepts of system 
thinking (Stanovich & West, 2000), we 
examine research findings relevant to 
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reducing the bias in decision making. We 
then propose ways in which the practitioner 
of customer development in the 
entrepreneurial context can improve 
decision-making. 
 
Entrepreneurs tend to be overly active, face 
time constraints, and hence, tend to rely on 
intuition.   According to Stanovich and 
West (2000), intuition as a basis for 
decision making is fast, automatic, 
effortless, implicit, and emotional (referred 
to as System 1). System 2 refers to 
reasoning, which is slower, conscious, 
effortful, explicit, and logical.  Levels of 
System 2 thinking include unstructured, 
clinical, and assisted (e.g., training). An 
excellent discussion of the implications of 
Stanovich and West’s (2000) work is given 
in Stanovich (2010) and in Kahneman 
(2011). Entrepreneurs often lack important 
information regarding a decision, fail to 
notice available information, and face time 
and cost constraints; hence, they tend to rely 
on intuitive System 1 thinking. But, reliance 
on System 1 thinking, intuition, has certain 
inherent weaknesses which may result in 
poor decisions. As Kahnemann (2011) 
notes, expert intuition is most trustworthy in 
an environment that is regular and 
predictable, and where the expert has had 
sufficient practice to learn the regularities of 
this environment, scarcely descriptive of the 
startup situation. 
 
Given that many entrepreneurial activities 
rely upon subjective and sparse information, 
this decision making is prone to significant 
errors in judgment. The presence of such 
forms of error in inquiry is well 
documented (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974; 
Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes & Hitt, 2009). 
Busenitz & Barney (1997) established 
specific differences in two biases 
(overconfidence and representativeness) 
between entrepreneurs and managers in 
large organizations. Schade and Koellinger 
(2007) review a detailed list of perceptual 
biases and heuristics in general that affect 
entrepreneurial decisions, including whether 
to start a business. Several of these biases 
and heuristics seem to carry the most risk 
for the customer development process: 
 
Selection bias. In its most common 
manifestation, the data that an entrepreneur 
gathers may be biased if she looks only to 
friends, colleagues, and known sources for 
testing her hypotheses. Blank argues that 
“getting out of the building” is a hedge 
against this bias, but many entrepreneurs 
still gravitate to comfortable and 
confirmatory sources. (Holcomb et al., 
2009) 
 
Representativeness bias. In the dynamic 
and uncertain startup environment, it is 
perhaps natural to generalize from small, 
non-random samples of data. Yet, to the 
extent that this bias interacts with the 
selection bias noted above, the validity of 
customer development information gathered 
can be severely compromised. 
 
Acquiescence bias. Related to selection 
bias, this represents the tendency of 
respondents to give the answers they think 
the entrepreneur wants to hear, rather than 
their unvarnished opinion. This is often 
referred to in the startup world as “not 
wanting to tell someone their baby is ugly.” 
 
Confirmation bias.  People tend to favor or 
interpret information in a way that confirms 
their prior beliefs. If we “believe” that a 
problem exists, we will listen for any 
evidence that “confirms” this belief and 
ignore all else. 
 
Overconfidence bias. “Overconfidence is 
the tendency for people to overestimate 
their knowledge, abilities and the precision 
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of their information” (Bhandari & Deaves, 
2006, p. 5). In many ways, overconfidence 
is essential for the entrepreneur to be able to 
act in an environment of such uncertainty 
(Koellinger, Minniti & Schade, 2007), but 
when overconfidence leads to the blocking 
out of new evidence or alternative 
perspectives, it  can be detrimental to the 
customer development process. 
 
Optimism bias. Kahneman (2011) notes that 
optimism is an essential characteristic of the 
entrepreneurial mindset but that it can lead 
to a strong tendency to ignore the relevant 
evidence. Cooper, Woo & Dunkelberg 
(1988) found entrepreneurs indeed 
experienced extreme optimism no matter 
the degree to which they were likely to 
succeed based on objective factors such as 
experience and the nature of the new 
business. In fact, optimism may be 
detrimental in the decisions of what kind of 
risk to take on, but essential in the actual 
implementation of the business once these 
decisions are made. For the startup 
entrepreneur, placing himself in the 
appropriate environment and with a group 
of teammates who will help temper this 
optimism bias in the early stages can 
mitigate the risk of poor decisions. Slater, 
Mohr, and Sengupta (2013) note that an 
organizational culture which emphasizes 
team interaction; however informal, leads to 
more successful radical product innovation 
capability. For innovators, this means 
“getting outside one’s head” and allowing 
all input, even that critical of the idea. 
 
Reducing Bias in Customer Development 
Processes 
An entire body of work has evolved over  
the last 20 years to illuminate the 
differences between intuitive (System 1) 
thinking and System 2, a more rational, 
logical and calculating approach.  As we 
have noted above, the startup environment 
thrives on intuitive (System 1) 
entrepreneurs – without them there would 
be no startups. Purely relying upon this 
intuitive and error-prone approach is too 
often a recipe for failure; yet the prior 
“System 2” methodologies used in 
innovation development, such as the 
traditional NPD process, may be 
inappropriate substitutes for the 
entrepreneur due to time and information 
constraints, and do not take into the account 
the highly uncertain nature of the 
entrepreneurial environment. Customer 
development seems to address this gap by 
offering a framework and techniques for 
testing the hypotheses that the startup has 
created through its more intuitive processes. 
Nevertheless, even moving to a “hypothesis 
testing” approach in the startup does not 
remove the risk that these very same biases 
will manifest themselves in the sources of 
information, the type of information sought, 
and the interpretation of that information. In 
the following section, we suggest certain 
approaches that may help to mitigate the 
risks of System 1 biases in the customer 
development process. Table 2 cross 
references these bias-mitigating techniques 
against the specific biases inherent in 
customer development. 
 
There is significant research that shows that 
System 1 thinking can be improved and that 
System 2 thinking can be encouraged. For 
example, a review of research by Fischhoff 
(1982) on four strategies as potential 
solutions for biased decision making found 
extended training and feedback, coaching, 
and other interventions to improve 
judgment. In specific, they found training 
and feedback to be superior to (1) offering 
warnings about the possibility of bias; (2) 
describing the direction of a bias; and (3) 
providing small doses of feedback. 
However, extended training with feedback 
only produced only moderate improvements  
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Table 2: Bias Mitigation Techniques in Customer Development 
 
Bias Description Mitigation techniques 
Selection bias seeking information from 
“friendly" confirmatory sources 
resulting in unrepresentative 
sampling of the target market(s) 
founding team members pair up in 
“getting out of the building” and 
check each other’s assumptions at 
all times careful attention to 
selection of interview targets 
Representativeness bias generalizing from small, non-
random samples of data and/or 
information from respondents 
who do not represent the target 
market(s) 
conducting customer development 
interviews as an iterative and 
continuous process, checking 
previous generalizations against 
new data 
Acquiescence bias respondents’ tendency to give the 
answers they believe the 
entrepreneur wants to hear 
carefully structuring customer 
development interviews to avoid 
“yes/no" answers;  not asking 
respondents to speculate on future 
behavior, but focusing on past and 
current behavior 
Confirmation Bias interpreting information to 
confirm prior beliefs 
maintaining open-ended interview 
discussion focused on problems, 
not proposed solution improper 
linear model development to 
simulate data-driven decision 
where actual measurement data is  
impractical if not impossible 
Overconfidence bias overestimating the knowledge
and precision of  customer
suggestions and/or the 
entrepreneurs information 
engaging mentors and advisors to 
provide an unbiased perspective 
on the information gathered  and 
to create an environment of 
System 2 thinking around the 
startup premortem exercises 
looking at potential causes of 
failure rather than assuming 
success; a belief that only the 
paranoid survive 
Optimism bias the entrepreneur’s belief that 
he/she is  unlikely to experience 
negative outcomes or fail 
analogical reasoning - engaging in  
“reference class forecast" 
activities comparing to other 
similar startups"consider the 
opposite” activities to force more 
critical thinking 
Some general bias mitigation activities include: 
• locating in an environment with other startups and advisors (incubator, co-working) where external 
feedback is readily available 
• undergoing training in customer development activities to strengthen information-gathering skills 
• conducting all customer development  activities as a team 
• engaging a mentor or advisor to play the devil’s advocate role in all customer development  activities  
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in decision making. The training research 
reviewed by Fischoff (1982) may be viewed 
as encouraging System 2 type thinking. The 
training research reviewed by Fischoff 
(1982) may be viewed as encouraging 
System 2 type thinking. In the startup 
environment, team members can provide 
checks and balances, in a sense offering to 
each other the initial training and feedback 
that can prevent against the injection of bias 
into the customer development process. In 
fact, Blank (2005) insists that all members 
of the founding team, regardless of 
discipline, take part in the “out of the 
building” hypothesis testing activities in 
order to eliminate the natural tendency for 
engineers to make their assumptions, 
business types to make theirs, and the result 
to be a compromise between opinions rather 
than some form of “fact,” a strongly held 
prior belief. 
 
There are other mechanisms that tend to 
encourage System 2 thinking. Kahneman 
and Lovallo (1993) discuss attempting to 
take an outsider’s perspective, that is, trying 
to remove oneself mentally from a specific 
situation or to consider the class of 
decisions to which the current problem 
belongs. For example, an entrepreneur 
could look at similar type startups to get 
what Flyvbjerg (2009) calls a “reference 
class forecast” of how much money it took 
to get to launch, how long until 
profitability, etc. Taking an outsider’s 
perspective has been shown to reduce 
decision makers’ overconfidence about their 
knowledge (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting, 1991), the time it would take 
them to complete a task (Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993), and their odds of 
entrepreneurial success (Cooper et al., 
1988). Decision makers may also be able to 
improve their judgments by asking a 
genuine outsider for his or her view 
regarding a decision. Kahneman (2013) 
provides a lucid discussion of this research. 
To do this requires the entrepreneur to be 
open to negative input, not an easy task. 
  
Encouraging people to “consider the 
opposite” of whatever decision they are 
about to make tends to reduce errors in 
judgment caused by various biases: 
overconfidence, the hindsight bias, and 
anchoring (Larrick, 2004; Mussweiler, 
Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000). Reduced error in 
judgment has also been achieved by having 
groups rather than individuals make 
decisions, training individuals in formal 
reasoning, and making people accountable 
for their decisions (Larrick, 2004; Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999). Thus, while the startup team 
is most accountable for decisions during the 
customer development activities, having an 
outside set of advisors, or an advisory board 
can insert a level of bias-reduction into the 
process. 
 
Analogical reasoning research has 
examined how System 2 thinking can be 
leveraged to reduce System 1 errors. 
Analogical reasoning can be used to reduce 
bounds on awareness (see Bazerman & 
Chugh 2005). Stemming from work by 
Thompson, Gentner, and Loewenstein 
(2000),  Idson, Chugh, Bereby-Meyer, 
Moran, Grosskopf, and Bazerman (2004) 
found people who were encouraged to 
comprehend common principles underlying 
seemingly unrelated tasks improved in their 
ability to discover solutions in a different 
task that relied on the same set of 
underlying principles. For example, an 
entrepreneurial team can study the success 
or failure of a  startup in a  separate but 
related field to open up their awareness to 
contradictory rather than only confirmatory 
evidence.   
 
Recent research on joint-versus-separate 
decision making indicates that people can 
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move from intuitive System 1 thinking 
toward the rational System 2 thinking if 
they contemplate and then choose between 
multiple options simultaneously rather 
doing the same separately for each option. 
Research by Bazerman, White, and 
Loewenstein (1995) suggests that choice 
options should be evaluated jointly rather 
than sequentially. For example, suppose the 
team is considering the match between three 
different product embodiments with three 
different target markets. Their research 
shows that evaluating the elements of the 
set jointly, collectively at one point in time, 
is superior to their evaluation sequentially at 
different points in time. Consistent with this 
work, Bazerman, Loewenstein, and White 
(1992) have found people exhibit more 
willpower when they weigh their choices 
jointly rather than separately. That is, a 
collective decision has more resolve than an 
aggregation of individual decisions. 
 
The entrepreneurial environment itself can 
be staged to encourage better decisions 
given System 1 thinking. Thaler and 
Sunstein’s (2003) work on “choice 
architects” suggests that mentors, 
accelerators, and incubators can design 
situations so as to encourage better choices, 
given known decision biases. Having an 
environment around the entrepreneurial 
team of people who can question the input 
from the hypothesis testing and provide 
neutral  feedback can serve as a de facto 
“System 2” overlay upon the process. In 
addition, the entrepreneurs in these 
programs can be trained, and supported, in 
reducing bias in their customer 
development processes, and be put into 
cross-team situations that encourage 
analogical reasoning to expand bounds of 
awareness. An example of a technique that 
can be employed is the premortem method 
suggested by Klein (2007). In essence, the 
entrepreneurial team “makes” a key 
decision in the planning stage, and then is 
asked to fast forward a year or two and 
imagine that the decision has failed 
disastrously.  By proactively discussing the 
hypothetical reasons for this failure, the 
team can counteract the overconfidence 
bias. 
 
One of the most successful System 2 
decision-making mechanisms is the 
improper linear model research associated 
with Robyn Dawes. Dawes and Corrigan 
(1974), in their seminal article, report 
simple linear models to be superior to 
clinical-type judgment and to simulate a 
System 2 t ype of decision making. Dawes 
and Corrigan (1974) report that simple 
linear models work well with input 
variables that have a conditionally 
monotonic1 relationship with the output. 
Numerous studies report that linear models 
produce predictions that are superior to 
those of experts across an impressive array 
of domains, see Hastie and Dawes (2010). 
Moreover, Dawes (1971) has shown that 
even improper linear models outperform 
clinical judgments. The remarkable 
implication of the above research shows 
that clinical and intuitive System 1 thinking 
can be transformed into rational System 2 
by 1) identifying potential predictors of an 
outcome, and then 2) providing a guess at 
the weights in a linear model. The weights 
could be as simple as: -1, 0, or +1, for a 
negative, neutral, or positive relationship or 
be a simple rating system: 0,1,2,3,4 
followed by the identification of the 
algebraic sign (+,-) denoting the 
relationship of the variable with the 
outcome.   
 
                                                 
1 A sequence {a(n)} such that either (1) 
a(i+1)>=a(i)  for every i >=1, or (2) 
a(i+1)<=a(i) for every i>=1. 
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Linear regression produces optimal weights; 
however, Dawes (1971) has shown that 
linear models with non-optimal weights are 
also superior to intuitive (System 1) 
judgments. This holds promise for the 
creation of models wherein there is little 
possibility of fully accurate measurement. 
When error is introduced through 
measurement rather than the item being 
measured, deviations from optimal 
weighting do not make much practical 
difference in the quality of decisions. Good 
predictions may be obtained by selecting 
variables that have some validity for 
predicting the outcome. An improper linear 
model with subjective weights guessed at 
by the user is likely to be just as accurate in 
predicting new cases as is ordinary least 
squares regression. The classic example is 
the Apgar score for new born babies, as 
described by Kahneman (2011, p. 277). 
 
“One day over breakfast, a medical 
resident asked how Dr. Apgar would 
make a systematic assessment of a 
newborn. “That’s easy,” she replied. 
“You would do it lik e this.” Apgar 
jotted down five variables (heart 
rate, respiration, reflex, muscle tone, 
and color) and three scores (0, 1, or 
2, depending on the robustness of 
each sign). Realizing that she might 
have made a break through that any 
delivery room could implement, 
Apgar began rating infants by this 
rule one minute after they were 
born. A baby with a total score of 8 
or above was likely to be pink, 
squirming, crying, grimacing, with a 
pulse of 100 or more-in good shape. 
A baby with a score of 4 or  below 
was probably bluish, flaccid, 
passive, with a slow or weak pulse-
in need of immediate intervention.” 
Applying Apgar’s score, the staff in 
delivery rooms finally had consistent 
standards for determining which 
babies were in trouble, and the 
formula is credited for an important 
contribution to reducing infant 
mortality. The Apgar test is still 
used every day in every delivery 
room.”  
 
The predictive accuracy of the improper 
linear model, the Apgar score, has 
subsequently been validated against 
extensive outcome data (Moster, Lie, 
Irgens, Bjerkedal & Markestad, 2001; 
Carter, McNabb & Merenstein, 1998). 
 
The amazing success of subjectively 
defined weighting schemes has an 
important practical implication for the 
entrepreneur as it is possible to develop a 
useful predictive model without any prior 
data collection such as that required for 
building a regression model. For example, a 
startup can develop a  simple and useful 
improper linear model by creating a set of 
key variables that the entrepreneurial team 
feels is valuable to measure, providing a 
subjective weighting system to these 
variables, and then using the customer 
development process to assign scores to 
each of these. A core framework for this 
would be the Business Model Canvas 
(Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010) which 
breaks down business models into nine 
graphically connected  segments.   The 
startup might determine, for example, that 
the key variables from the Business Model 
Canvas are the potential revenue models, 
the customer segments, and the presence of 
key partners in the distribution channel. By 
simultaneously evaluating each of its 
possible alternatives here, and assigning 
each a subjective “score,” the 
entrepreneurial team has essentially created 
a predictive improper linear model. It is 
critical that these evaluations be conducted 
in a simultaneous rather than sequential 
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manner; in other words, the process suffers 
if the company eliminates one possibility 
before moving on to the next instead of 
scoring them all. As noted, even though 
these items and their weights are user-
defined and non-optimal, a decision based 
upon this process brings non-biased System 
2 thinking into the process. 
 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The review and study of customer 
development and lean launch 
methodologies is important to innovation 
and entrepreneurial activities, as these 
processes are becoming well instantiated at 
the practitioner level. The speed required 
for successful innovation will not abate, and 
thus, both academics and practitioners will 
continue to seek more effective frameworks 
and processes. The concept of lean startups, 
driven by such tools as customer 
development, promises to remain an 
important part of the entrepreneurial 
approach. As noted, the National Science 
Foundation recently adopted the Customer 
Development approach to the 
commercialization of NSF funded 
innovation through its i-Corps program 
(NSF, 2012), and many leading universities 
have restructured their innovation and 
entrepreneurship education curriculum 
around this methodology ( c.f.  Stanford, 
Berkeley, MIT). Larger companies are 
starting to explore variations of this process 
for “intrapreneurship” activities as well 
(Karlsson & Nordström, 2012), in industries 
as diverse as manufacturing (Blank, 2013) 
and healthcare (Silva & Nascimento, 2013.) 
The process of customer development is 
intended to not only accelerate the process 
of innovation (the FFE) but also reduce the 
risk of error by continual iteration on the 
product-market fit before significant 
investment. There is little in this process 
that isn’t a part of one or another of the 
earlier new product development 
frameworks, but CD’s emphasis on  full 
team participation, continuing face-to-face 
customer contact, and reliance on “out of 
the building” work have the potential of 
eliminating some of the biases inherent in 
the innovation process. On the other hand, 
customer development has its own risks that 
need to be acknowledged and addressed. 
For example, there can be a   tendency, 
especially for the first-time entrepreneur, to 
become more focused on the activity of 
customer development than the outcomes, 
in essence to rely too much on fine tuning 
these results at the expense of their 
intuition. In other words, customer 
development is no more inoculated from 
“paralysis by analysis” than any other NPD 
processes. Furthermore, there is a key role 
for actual data collection and analysis in the 
early stages of the startup (Croll & 
Yoskovitz, 2013) through the introduction 
of key metrics and testing. Customer 
development can provide the direction for 
choosing these metrics, so that assumptions 
and hypotheses can be tested empirically 
wherever possible. 
 
As noted, educators are increasingly relying 
on lean startup and customer development 
activities for college and even high school 
level entrepreneurship courses. This 
provides a unique opportunity to educate 
their students about entrepreneurial biases, 
and to prepare them with the tools and 
techniques to minimize biases in both 
information gathering and decision-making. 
Based upon the findings of Fischhoff 
(1982), this training can be effective and 
will ideally translate to later entrepreneurial 
activities. The same can apply to 
entrepreneurial support groups such as 
incubators and accelerators and, in this case, 
preparing their mentors and advisors to be 
alert for these entrepreneurial biases can 
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encourage deeper System 2 approaches. 
Even using different companies in the 
incubator as both a   referent class for 
comparison as well as a friendly “check and 
balance” can take best advantage of the 
group setting.  
 
Several interesting research directions also 
emerge from this review. The prevalence of 
the Business Model Canvas and Lean 
Canvas methodologies could be studied to 
identify which subsets of questions in 
customer development are most relevant for 
product-market fit. Is there a specific order 
in which the customer development 
hypothesis testing model increases the 
chances of success, and, if so, can 
innovators and their partners (such as 
venture capital firms and business 
accelerators) create specific programs to 
take advantage of this? For example, is it 
more effective to talk to a group of potential 
customers in one field at a time, or to test 
several customer segments simultaneously 
with regard to bias reduction? In addition, 
the use of simple linear models with 
customer development and lean startup 
offers the framework to validate the 
evaluation methods. Just as the Apgar score, 
an improper linear model, was validated 
against subsequent data, testing the 
improper linear models inherent in the 
customer development process against a set 
of established outcome measures would 
provide another means of reducing bias 
from the process while still recognizing the 
intuitive side of the entrepreneurial process.  
Future research could focus on the 
development and testing of such improper 
linear models around a tool often used in 
the lean startup process such as the 
Business Model Canvas.  
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